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Asia’s success in developing an outward-looking export-oriented growth strategy is largely 
based on the region’s rapid assimilation into the global economy. Within this framework, 
however, there has emerged a large and persistent global imbalance in which Asia accounts for 
the bulk of the global current account surplus and the United States accounts for most of that 
deficit. That situation has produced a mutual dependence whereby the United States depends 
on Asia to finance its external deficit, and Asia depends on the United States to help drive the 
demand for its exports. Whether or not the global imbalance was at the root cause of, or at least 
contributed to, the current financial crisis, there is nonetheless widespread concern about the 
sustainability of the global imbalance. If another global crisis is to be averted then a new Asian 
growth strategy will need to emerge that involves rebalancing the region’s growth towards both 
domestic and intraregional demand-driven absorption of the region’s continued rapid output 
expansion. For that shift is to occur raises the question about whether Asia can decouple from 
the United States as well as other extra-regional markets like that of the European Union.  
Proponents of the decoupling view argue that Asian economies now have more diversified 
export markets, and they also point to more robust domestic and intra-regional growth drivers 
that are independent of the US and other developed economies. China in particular has the 
potential to drive that intra-regional growth, a phenomenon that has already by exemplified by 
the emergence of its large trade and investments with East and Southeast Asia. There are, 
nonetheless, a large number of opponents to this view. Those who argue that decoupling is 
unlikely to occur point to the fact that intra-regional and extra-regional trade flows in Asia are 
largely made up of parts and components that eventually supply the United States and other 
developed economies. Reversing that pattern in Asia, they argue, would be neither feasible nor 
desirable.  
The present study examines the empirical evidence underlying these arguments as a means of 
establishing some forwarding looking views about what options are available to the Asian 
economies. First, it demonstrates that the strong linkages both within Asia and between Asia 
and the United States and Europe have not waned in the last 25 years. However, the 
transmission channels have become more complex as new sources of those spillovers arise in 
terms of portfolio flows, stock market volatility, and integrated production networks. As a 
consequence, it is unlikely that Asia’s business-cycle co-movements with the US and European 
economies will diminish in the near to medium term.  
Second, the study finds that there are significant downside risks for the recovery of growth in the 
United States and Europe. Over the medium term, US and EU consumer spending are 
expected to be sluggish relative to economies like China where earlier high savings rates are 
expected to fall significantly as the government introduces stimulus packages centered on 
expenditures. If Asia leads the recovery with China at its center, the policy focus should be on 
mechanisms to shift trade as well as investment from slow growth markets to the more dynamic 
economies. That shift could support a structural change in Asia’s trading patterns over the 
medium term. 
Thirdly, the types of goods produced in Asia as outsourcing for large enterprises is likely to 
incorporate more second-generation technology that could increasingly promote intra-regional 
production networks. Nonetheless, multinationals will probably continue to be dominated by US, 
EU and, to a lesser extent, Japanese firms, since it is unlikely that, as a group, the shares of 
these top-ranked companies will be eroded in the future. For the Asian countries to develop 
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their own cross-national production networks and compete in the global market they will need to 
implement more aggressive domestic investment and technological development programs. 
One effective channel that has been successfully pursued by some counties is to encourage 
investment by foreign transnationals as a means of attracting technology and production know-
how. Another has been the implementation of sub-regional cooperation schemes aimed at 
developing scale economies and private capital investment of the magnitude needed for 
effective competition at the global level. However, schemes like the ASEAN Investment Area 
(AIA) have to date had limited success because of the large number of exceptions that create 
disincentives among private investors. Moreover, while shorter distance between Asian 
countries facilitates bilateral FDI flows, low sovereign risk, a transparent and predictable 
regulatory environment and small corporate tax rates in the host countries are also important 
determinant that so far have been deterrents to cross-border investments in many Asia 
countries.   
Another finding of the study is that stock market indicators in Asia are highly correlated with the 
major financial centers in the United States and Europe. The extent of these co-movements is 
much greater now than they were before in the 1980s and 1990s, and Asia’s major stock market 
linkages to the major US and EU financial centers will likely continue to increase. De-coupling in 
the financial markets could negatively alter the growing share of portfolio flows in the region’s 
overall private capital flows.  
Finally, pegged and managed exchange rates will likely continue to form part of the policy tools 
used in most Asian economies, notwithstanding the lessons from the Asian financial crisis. 
Recent changes in the international competitiveness of the region’s countries have been 
unfavorable to some countries. The resulting appreciation of some currencies in terms of their 
real effective exchange rates relative to other Asian economies and major US and European 
markets could push policymakers to adopt the types of exchange rate policies that were 
introduced after the Asian financial crisis but have since then been abandoned by most 
countries. Otherwise the continued management of exchange rates could have a considerable 
impact on competitive adjustments that could, in turn, undermine the recovery in the global 
economy through a much-needed rebalancing of the global current account. 
A number of forwarding looking policy implications can be derived from these findings. First, the 
current downturn in economic activity throughout Asia highlights the inherent unsustainability of 
an economic growth model dependent on foreign demand. This situation has given rise to 
widespread suggestions by policymakers in the Asian economies to take concrete actions to 
rebalance their economies in such a way that will ensure greater sustainability in the medium to 
long run. Yet the fundamental question facing those policymakers is how to rebalance growth in 
a manner that reduces the region’s dependence on the continued global current account 
imbalance. Policies promoting greater domestic consumption are generally favored over those 
encouraging investment since Asia’s widening current account surplus has been driven by high 
savings rates. Moreover, there is stronger evidence of over-saving than under-investment in the 
region, and stronger evidence of over-investment prior to the 1997 Asian crisis than 
underinvestment after the Asian crisis. This phenomenon suggests that the key to rebalancing 
Asian growth toward domestic sources lies in promoting consumption rather than investment. 
There is also considerable scope for deepening trade liberalization within the ASEAN countries 
and broadening the coverage to other Asian countries as a means of strengthening the so-
called ‘domestic’ regional economy. A larger regional bloc would promote scale economies and 
specialization in differentiated products that would expand intra-industry trade in Asia. Progress 
in moving from a free trade area to a customs union in ASEAN could also yield substantial 
producer and consumer welfare benefits to the region. The resulting expansion in production 
and domestic demand in individual Asian economies could stimulate cross-border production 
 
 Prospects for Decoupling in Asia’s Growth Model  Page vii 
activities to target the increased demand for final goods and thereby increase the relative 
importance of final goods in intraregional trade. In addition to the progress being made among 
the ASEAN+3 countries, there is now growing interest in expanding trade between Southeast 
Asia and South Asia. 
Finally, there are also opportunities for countries to adopt more flexible exchange rate regimes 
that would enable Asian countries to adopt policies that promote a rebalancing based on the 
reallocation of resources from the production of tradables to nontradables. The prescription 
could become all the more appropriate if there were to occur a further US dollar depreciation, as 
part of the reversal of the global current account imbalance. In that case, many Asian currencies 
would likely experience a significant nominal and real exchange rate appreciation. Lower 
relative prices would help to shift resources toward production for domestic use, raise 
household incomes and stimulate consumption. Although in the short run it is unlikely that 
policymakers will embrace these expenditure switching measures that shift demand between 
domestic goods and imports, it could become a long-term strategy in the context of rebalancing 
growth towards domestic sources. 
At the regional level, the US dollar’s chronic instability and Asia’s growing influence over how 
the region develops could produce a new monetary order in which either a new or existing 
regional currency would serve as the vehicle for international trade transactions. One 
mechanism has been proposed by China to introduce an International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
asset that would decouple international transactions from the US dollar. In the interim, some 
countries like Indonesia have introduced bilateral currency swap arrangements (BCSAs) as a 
means of reducing their dependence on the US dollar. Another mechanism for reducing 
transactions risks is the example of the euro’s dominance as a settlement currency within its 
regional domain. A similar vehicle within East Asia might be possible, given the region’s large 
economic size and far-reaching trade connections. Countries pegging softly to a key 
international currency within the region would be more likely to use it as their main intervention 
currency as well as a reserve currency. While the dollar would dominate reserve holdings within 
the dollar area and the euro within the euro area, an East Asian currency could become the 
settlement currency in that regional domain. In that way, efficiency gains of a limited number of 









Asia’s exceptional success in developing an outward-looking export-oriented growth strategy is 
largely based on the region’s rapid assimilation into the global economy. While industrial growth 
and transformation have been the driving force behind that growth, its handmaiden has been 
the dynamic global trade expansion, as well as large inflows of direct and portfolio investments 
associated with global production and market growth. However, the emergence of large and 
persistent current account surpluses since the 1997 Asian crisis has created a global imbalance 
in which Asia accounts for the bulk of the global current account surplus and the United States 
accounts for most of that deficit. That situation has produced a mutual dependence whereby the 
United States depends on Asia to finance its external deficit, and Asia depends on the United 
States to help drive the demand for its exports. While that global imbalance has enabled the 
global market to absorb the expansion of global supplies resulting from China and India’s entry 
into the world economy, there have been suggestions that the so-called global savings glut 
contributed to the current global financial crisis.1 The argument is that the shift in GDP from the 
lower-saving industrialized countries to the higher-saving developing countries has raised the 
global supply of savings, suppressed long term real interest rates and caused the current 
account deficits in the industrialized countries.2
Whether or not the global imbalance was at the root cause of, or at least contributed to, the 
current financial crisis, there is nonetheless widespread concern about the sustainability of the 
current account imbalances. If another global crisis is to be averted then a new Asian growth 
strategy will need to emerge that involves rebalancing the region’s growth towards both 
domestic and intraregional demand-driven absorption of the region’s continued rapid output 
expansion. If such a shift is to occur, then it raises the question about whether Asia can 
decouple from the United States as well as other extra-regional markets like that of the 
European Union. Proponents of the decoupling view argue that Asian economies now have 
more diversified export markets, and they also point to more robust domestic and intra-regional 
growth drivers that are independent of the US and other developed economies. With a 
consumer market of 1.3 billion, China has the potential to drive that intra-regional growth, a 
phenomenon that has already by exemplified by the emergence of its large trade and 
investments with East and Southeast Asia.  
 
There are, nonetheless, a large number of opponents to this view. Those who argue that 
decoupling is unlikely to occur point to the fact that intra-regional and extra-regional trade flows 
in Asia are largely made up of parts and components that eventually supply the United States 
and other developed economies. Reversing that pattern in Asia would be neither feasible nor 
desirable. For decoupling to occur in the medium to long-term, Asia would need to 
fundamentally diversify its export markets and shift a significant portion of its production to 
domestic markets. While the share of Asia’s exports to the G3 (US, EU and Japan) has indeed 
been on the decline in recent years, the United States remains one of the largest export markets 
                                                          
1 The hypothesis has been put forward by the present Chairman of the US Federal Reserve, Ben Bernanke in “The 
Global Saving Glut and the U.S. Current Account Deficit”, Sandridge Lecture, Virginia Association of Economics, 
Richmond, Virginia, Federal Reserve Board, March 2005. 
2 Often-cited evidence is the fact that China’s national savings rate was 54 percent in 2007, while that of the United 
States has been near zero.  
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for most Asian economies. And while Asia’s trade appears to have diversified into other intra-
regional and other extra-regional markets, the fact remains that much of that trade is in the form 
of intermediate goods that are processed within the region for export to large markets like those 
of the United States and Europe. For that reason, a recent study by the Monetary Authority of 
Singapore concludes that there is little evidence of structural decoupling in the long run.3 
Similarly, the ADB’s Asian Development Outlook report for 2007 stated that, “Despite the 
emergence of the PRC economy and the increase in the Asian region’s share in global 
production and trade, [the evidence indicates] that the rise in intra-Asian economic 
interdependence through investment and trade is being driven by the globalization process.”4 A 
subsequent study by the ADB underscores the importance of Asia’s global links and concludes 
that Asia’s intra-regional and extra-regional relationships have reinforce each other since, 
among other, the recent surge in intraregional trade in parts and components has been largely 
driven by global final goods exports.5
B. Coverage and Delimitations of the Study 
 
The present study examines the empirical evidence underlying these arguments as a means of 
establishing some forwarding looking views about what options are available to the Asian 
economies. The paper is structured as follows: After this introductory section, Section II 
discusses the Asian growth model and the international transmission of business cycles. The 
first part of that section sets out the major views about sources of growth and the new 
globalization process. The second part addresses that globalization process in the context of 
synchronization of business cycle synchronization within Asia and between Asia and the United 
States and Europe. It covers both the degree and magnitude of those transmissions and the 
dynamics underlying their transmissions to the Asian economies.  
Section III addresses the issue of Asia’s decoupling in the context of sources of spillovers to the 
region, namely, trade linkages, financial channels, and commodity prices. Based on the 
empirical findings, the final part of the section examines the prospect for Asia’s decoupling from 
the United States and the European Union in terms of trade and financial channels that include 
foreign direct investment (FDI), portfolio flows and use of international currency linkages 
affecting the region’s international competitiveness. Section IV examines the policy implications 
of the findings in terms of the Asian growth model, shifting to inward looking markets, trade and 
investment policy regimes as well as the exchange rate regimes, and the implementation of a 
new international financial architecture.  
The country coverage of this report consists of members of the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), 
which comprises the 13 members of ASEAN Plus Three (Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, 
Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam, plus 
China, Japan, and South Korea) India, Mongolia and Pakistan. 
 
                                                          
3 Monetary Authority of Singapore, “Revisiting the US-Asia Decoupling Hypothesis”. Special Feature B. Economic 
Policy Department. Macroeconomic Review, October 2007. 
4 Asian Development Bank, “Asian Development Outlook 2007”. Manila, 2007.  
5 Asian Development Bank, “Emerging Asian Regionalism: A Partnership for Shared Prosperity”. Manila, 2008.  
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II. LINKAGES TO THE US AND EU ECONOMIES IN THE 
ASIAN GROWTH MODEL 
 
A. Sources of Asian Growth 
1. Main Sources of Growth 
There are three widely recognized explanations of economic growth in Asia. The first focuses on 
supply growth in the region to explain the ‘Asian Miracle’ associated with capital accumulation, 
the absorption or assimilation of increasingly modern technology and the change in industrial 
structures.6 Whether driven by capital accumulation or by its productive assimilation, the growth 
process was accompanied by major changes in the structure of the East Asian economies.7
A closely related but more recent explanation is the fundamentalist view that structural factors 
have explained, first, the long-term growth of the Southeast Asian economies until mid-1997 
and, second, the crisis in late 1997 and 1998. During the stellar years of the ‘miracle’ economies 
the dominant factors producing an outward-oriented, export-led growth were high domestic 
savings, human capital development, sound macro management and limited price distortions 
combined with careful policy interventions. During the 1997-98 crisis, structural factors also 
dominated events, but this time in the form of weak financial systems that were undermined by 
large capital flows and exchange rate misalignments. One explanation of these misalignments is 
the widespread use of relatively fixed exchange rate regimes. These regimes eventually needed 
to be reversed through the process of nominal and real deprecations of currencies that took 
place beginning in the latter part of 1997.
 
Notwithstanding the severe economic and financial crisis that hit all the countries in late 1997 
and 1998, the view holds that the factors determining supply growth are largely intact and will 
undoubtedly continue to influence the region under a favorable policy environment.  
8
                                                          
6 See Kim, J.I. and L.J. Lau, “The Sources of Economic Growth in the East Asian Newly Industrialized Countries”. 
Journal of Japanese and International Economics. 8: 235-71, 1994; Stiglitz, J., “The Role of International Financial 
Institutions in the Current Global Economy”. Address to the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations. Chicago (27 
February), 1997; World Bank, The Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press for the World Bank, 1993; and Young, A., “The Tyranny of Numbers: Confronting the Statistical Realities of the 
East Asian Growth Experience”. Quarterly Journal of Economics. 110: 64 l-680, 1995. 
 An alternative explanation is that the cyclical 
variations in the real dollar-yen rate created the misalignment and impacted on trade, 
investment and capital flows of the Southeast Asian countries, rather than exchange rate 
7 Nelson, R.R., and H. Pack (), “The Asian Miracle and Modern Growth Theory”. Economic Journal 109, July, 1999. 
8 The other major explanation of the 1997-98 crisis focuses on the possible impact of expectations in the asset 
market as they affected the recent financial crisis in Asia (Sachs, 1997, and Stiglitz, 1997). These negative 
expectations reflected a lack of confidence in the asset market that led to panic liquidation in all the Southeast Asian 
stock markets. The liquidation, in turn, instigated large movements of funds offshore that reversed capital flows and 
drained official reserves. The resulting downward pressure on exchange rates was essentially domestically induced, 
although there were spillovers that gave rise to contagion and the pervasiveness of the Asian financial crisis. Since in 
this study we are concerned with real international product and financial linkages of the ASEAN-5, this interpretation 
of events during 1997-98 will not be examined here. See Krugman, P., “What Happened to Asia?” Cambridge: 
Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1998. Available: http://web.mit.edu/krugman/www/ 
disinter.html; Goldstein, The Asian Financial Crisis: Causes, Cures, and Systemic Implications. Policy Analyses in 
International Economics 55. Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1998; Corsetti, G., P. Pesenti, 
and N. Roubini, “What Caused the Asian Currency and Financial Crisis?” New York: Stern School of Business. New 
York University, 1998. 
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mismanagement on the part of these countries.9
 The third explanation of economic growth in Asia focuses on the rapid assimilation of the region 
in the global economy. While recognizing that industrial growth and transformation have been 
the driving force behind the economic growth of Southeast Asia, that process has been 
supported by the large growth of international trade and direct and portfolio investment 
generated by the rapid expansion of global production and markets. For most Asian economies 
the systemic changes in the world economy have generated large volumes of international 
capital inflows and transactions in goods and services, as well as generating a widespread 
diffusion of production, transportation, and communication technologies from corporate 
contracting arrangements. The introduction of new technologies through cross-border 
production networks and the dissemination of new skills in the workforce have now become as 
important to the specialization of production activities in the Asian economies as their capital, 
labor and natural resource endowments. 
 Dollar-yen rate variations are believed to have 
affected the region’s international competitiveness, FDI flows, and short-term foreign currency 
indebtedness well before the crisis, and to have had a pervasive influence on the pattern of 
trade and investment in throughout the region. 
This new globalization process emphasizes demand-led growth and the policy environment as a 
critical determinant of that growth. Until roughly the mid-1980s many of the region's countries 
relied on exports as the main engine for economic growth, which implied a liberalization of trade 
and an emphasis on the facilitating role of the government. The shift from an export-driven 
growth strategy by many Asian countries to a growth strategy targeting global production and 
market networks was largely driven by efforts to exploit the worldwide growth of cross-border 
production and international capital movements. While the earlier outward-oriented strategy 
promoted economic growth in a number of Asian economies through the introduction of high 
value-added products into their economies, the new strategy has targeted the broad-based 
transmission of domestic learning and knowledge accumulation as a means of sustaining high 
economic growth rates.  
B. Globalization and Synchronization of Business Cycles 
1. Synchronization in the Global Economy 
Growing openness of economies and increasing globalization of production processes that has 
driven growth in the Asian economies have contributed to the international transmission of 
business cycles. Recent studies suggest that the industrialized countries of North America and 
Western Europe are increasingly coinciding with one another because of the linkages the key 
macroeconomic and financial variables related to business and financial cycles in these 
countries. Claessens, Kose, and Terrones (2008), for example, found that one-half of the 
industrialized countries experienced a synchronization of their recessions in the 1990s and early 
2000s. Another recent study by Kose, Otrok and Prasad (2008) showed that the coincidence of 
those cycles have been much greater when investment changes generate those movements 
than when they are caused by consumption changes. In Asia, however, Hong, Lee, and Tang 
(2009) found that, with the exception of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, there is generally less 
synchronization of business cycles than in the industrialized countries. 
                                                          
9 See McKinnon, R., “The East Asian Dollar Standard, Life After Death?”. Presented to the Workshop on “Rethinking 
the East Asian Miracle”. The Asia Foundation, San Francisco, California, 16-17 February, 1999; and Ohno, K., 
“Exchange Rate Management in Developing Asia: A Reassessment of the Pre-crisis Soft Dollar Zone”. ADBI Working 
Paper 1. Asian Development Bank, Tokyo, 1999. 
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Table 2.1: Correlation between Economic Activities 
of ASEM Member Countries, 1980-2008 









Brunei  0.94 0.79 0.81 0.88 
Cambodia 0.95 0.83 0.78 0.89 
Indonesia 0.93 0.83 0.76 0.88 
Lao PDR 0.93 0.78 0.78 0.87 
Malaysia 0.94 0.87 0.74 0.89 
Myanmar 0.76 0.57 0.78 0.73 
Philippines 0.93 0.86 0.74 0.88 
Singapore 0.91 0.89 0.69 0.87 
Thailand 0.90 0.89 0.68 0.85 
Vietnam 0.85 0.66 0.76 0.80 
China 0.94 0.69 0.79 0.88 
Japan 0.62 0.71 0.36 0.58 
South Korea 0.83 0.82 0.60 0.78 
India 0.94 0.83 0.70 0.89 
Mongolia 0.37 0.06 0.35 0.30 
Pakistan 0.95 0.87 0.63 0.89 
Note: Economic activity is measured by real GDP. 
Source of data: IMF, World Economic Outlook (WEO) database, 
April 2009. 
1.1. Synchronization of Business Cycles in Asia 
Before analyzing linkages between the Asian and US and EU economies, we need to examine 
whether economic downturns and expansionary movements have coincided among the Asian 
economies themselves. If there has been synchronization of those movements within the 
region, then we can make generalizations about movements in key macroeconomic and 
financial variables for Asia as a whole relative to global shocks originating in the United States 
and the European Union. Otherwise, it will 
be necessary to approach the issue of 
dependency linkages for the Asian countries 
from a more disaggregated point of view. 
Table 2.1 shows the average correlation 
coefficient between pairs of Asian countries 
based on annual time series data for 1980-
2008. The average for all countries is 0.8, 
but it is higher for the ASEAN-5 (Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and 
Thailand) at 0.93 with other ASEAN member 
countries than for the other ASEAN member 
countries (0.89).10
1.2. Synchronization of Asia and US/EU Business Cycles 
 The “Plus 3” members of 
ASEAN China, Japan and Korea) have a 
correlation coefficient of 0.75 between their 
economic activity and that of all ASEM 
member countries, although China’s 
correlation with ASEAN member countries is 
high (0.94). Among the new members of 
ASEM (India, Mongolia and Pakistan) the 
correlation coefficient between their 
economic activity and ASEM countries is 
relatively high for India and Pakistan (both 
0.89) but it is low for Mongolia (0.3). By way of comparison, the correlation coefficient between 
economic activity in the United States and the European Union is 0.998. 
The lack of a strong interrelationship of business cycles among all Asian countries, except for 
those of most ASEAN members as well as China and India, suggests the need for caution about 
generalizations and points to the need to examine business cycle synchronizations at the 
country level. Table 2.2 reports the correlation coefficients between ASEM member countries 
and the United States and European Union, both concurrently and with a one-period lead by the 
United States and European Union.11
We also tested the extent of Asia’s business cycle synchronization with the United States and 
 The results support the existence of a same period 
synchronization off business cycles, with relatively weaker linkages for Brunei Darussalam, 
Myanmar and Mongolia. It is not surprising to find that Asia’s synchronization of business cycles 
are equally strong for the United States as for the European Union since the correlation 
coefficient between economic activity in the United States and the European Union is near unity. 
                                                          
10 Correlations of 0.9 or more are highlighted in bold. 
11 In comparing concurrent and one-period leads of US and EU business cycles, higher ASEM member country 
correlations are highlighted in bold. 
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Table 2.2: Correlation between Economic Activity 
of ASEM Member Countries and US/EU, 1980-
2008 









Brunei  0.80 0.78 0.79 0.81 0.80 0.80 
Cambodia 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.96 0.97 0.96 
Indonesia 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 
Lao PDR 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.96 0.96 0.96 
Malaysia 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.98 
Myanmar 0.88 0.90 0.89 0.86 0.87 0.87 
Philippines 0.95 0.96 0.96 0.94 0.95 0.94 
Singapore 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.99 0.99 
Thailand 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.97 
Vietnam 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.96 0.96 0.96 
China 0.95 0.96 0.95 0.94 0.94 0.94 
Japan 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.95 0.94 0.95 
Korea 0.99 0.99 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.99 
India 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.95 0.95 0.95 
Mongolia 0.86 0.88 0.87 0.83 0.85 0.84 
Pakistan 0.98 0.99 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.97 
ASEAN 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.98 
ASEAN+3 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.99 0.99 
ASEM 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 
Note 1: Economic activity is measured by real GDP. 
Note 2: (+1) refers to one-period ahead GDP of 
corresponding country (US and/or EU). 
Source of data: IMF, World Economic Outlook (WEO) 
database, April 2009. 
the European Union over time. The results show that business cycle movements coincide as 
much in the current decade as they did in the 1990s.12
1.3. Magnitude of Business Cycle Transmissions 
 The extent of synchronization was 
somewhat lower in the 1990s because of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, whose spread to the 
United States and Western Europe was limited to a mini-crash in the stock market percentage 
loss was relatively small compared to some other notable crashes. 
The consequences of US and EU business 
cycle spillovers on the Asia economies are 
particularly visible during the recession 
periods. Nonetheless, there has been 
considerable variation in the extent to which 
US and EU economic downturns have 
impacted the region, and there is no clear 
trend as to whether the magnitude of those 
transmissions has decreased or intensified 
(Table 2.3). In the ASEAN region, a 
deceleration in US and EU economic growth 
has, on average, led to a more-that-
proportional slowdown of growth in the ASEAN 
region. In fact, for every one percent 
deceleration in the United States, economic 
growth in the ASEAN region has slowed by 1.5 
percent. In contrast, economic growth changes 
in the other ASEM countries (China, India, 
Japan, Mongolia, Pakistan and South Korea) 
have had a less-than-proportional response to 
a US deceleration in growth. These results 
reflect averages, however, and among the 
non-ASEAN countries there have been 
considerable variations.  
Underlying causes of the US and EU economic downturns explain variations in their impact on 
the Asian economies. The 1982 US recession brought about by credit tightening and the 
accompanying increase in interest rates created large output contractions in developing Asia. 
The stock market crash on October 1987 followed by the 1990 Gulf War combined to produce 
the 1991 US recession, but its spread to Asia was mitigate by more moderate downturns in 
Europe and Japan. In contrast, the 2001 “dot-com bubble” combined with the September 11 
attacks in the United States had a profound effect on East Asia in the aftermath of the 1997 Asia 
financial crisis. The December 2007 collapse of the housing market that spread to bank 
collapses in the United States and Europe caused an enormous liquidity and solvency crises 
because of the sharp reduction in the amount of available credit. The recession spread to Asia 
rapidly and affected much of the region to a far greater extent that the earlier externally 
originating recessions. Both trade and financial contractions have now spread throughout the 
region. Japan’s exports to the United States and Europe have fallen sharply, South Korea’s 
exports have also contracted, and foreign exchange reserves of Pakistan have suffered from 
mounting debt obligations. In the ASEAN member countries, the International Monetary Fund 
attributes the attributes the speed and intensity of the spillover from the global crisis to both the 
                                                          
12 The correlation coefficient between the ASEM region and US+EU is 0.99 in both the 1990s and 2000s. 
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ASEAN US plus EU 0.94 1.00 
China US plus EU 0.56 2.43  
India US plus EU 0.26 2.67  
Other ASEM US plus EU 0.86 0.45  
Note: The elasticity measures the percentage change in real 
GDP of each country or grouping brought about by a 1 percent 
change in the real GDP growth of the United States and the 
European Union. 
region’s greater integration with the global economy and the deepening financial ties with the 
rest of the world.13
1.4. Dynamics Underlying Business Cycle Transmissions 
  
The recent volatility of economic activity in the ASEM countries makes the prediction of short-
term activity a challenging one. While the systematic determinants of global linkages are 
relatively stable and robust, we are also interested in capturing the dynamics underlying rapidly 
changing variables to provide a relatively good explanation of recent developments and future 
changes likely to affect these economies.  
Our estimates of the international 
transmission of income and other changes 
on the ASEM countries separate the long-
run or equilibrium relationships between 
domestic income and foreign income from 
the short-run or dynamic disequilibrium 
components of those relationships. The 
estimates of the ASEM countries’ global 
linkages are based on an error-correction 
mechanism (ECM) specification that 
                                                          
13 International Monetary Fund (2009a), “Asia and Pacific. Global  Crisis: The Asian Context”. World Economic and 
Financial Surveys. Washington, DC, May 2009. 
Table 2.3: US and EU Recessions and ASEM Member Country Growth, 1982-2009 
  Recession 
  1982 1985 1991 2001 2009 Average 
  Deceleration in GDP growth (mean for groupings) 1/ 
United States -4.5% -3.1% -2.0% -2.9% -3.9% -3.3% 
European Union 1.0% -0.1% -1.6% -1.9% -5.1% -1.5% 
ASEM, of which  -0.2% 1.1% -1.4% -2.7% -4.8% -1.6% 
ASEAN -2.7% -7.8% -1.1% -5.1% -6.0% -4.6% 
China, Japan, Korea 0.0% 1.7% -1.3% -2.5% -4.9% -1.4% 
India, Mongolia, Pakistan -1.8% 0.8% -3.2% -1.9% -2.9% -1.8% 
  Ratio of ASEM Growth Changes to US Growth Changes 
ASEM, of which  0.04 -0.37 0.70 0.92 1.24 0.50 
ASEAN 0.61 2.57 0.55 1.75 1.54 1.41 
China, Japan, Korea -0.01 -0.55 0.65 0.87 1.28 0.45 
India, Mongolia, Pakistan 0.41 -0.25 1.54 0.65 0.74 0.62 
  Ratio of ASEM Growth Changes to EU Growth Changes 
ASEM, of which  -0.20 -19.98 0.88 1.40 0.94 -3.39 
ASEAN -2.75 137.61 0.70 2.69 1.17 27.88 
China, Japan, Korea 0.03 -29.53 0.82 1.34 0.97 -5.27 
India, Mongolia, Pakistan -1.85 -13.48 1.95 0.99 0.56 -2.37 
  Percent of Countries Experiencing Growth Deceleration 
ASEM, of which  64% 67% 56% 94% 88% 74% 
ASEAN 75% 78% 60% 90% 80% 77% 
China, Japan, Korea 33% 67% 33% 100% 100% 67% 
India, Mongolia, Pakistan 67% 33% 67% 100% 100% 73% 
Source: Based on real GDP data from IMF, World Economic Outlook database, April 2009. Table design adopted from World 
Economic Outlook (IMF 2007) and K. Hong, J-W Lee and H.C. Tang, "Crises in Asia: Historical Perspectives and 
Implications". ADB Economic Series Working Papers No. 152, April 2009. 
1/ Deceleration refers to change in GDP growth. 
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provides the means by which the short-run observed behavior of variables is associated with 
their long-run equilibrium growth paths. The ECM adjusts for any disequilibrium between 
variables that are cointegrated. As a result, it provides the means by which the short-run 
observed behavior of variables is associated with their long-run equilibrium growth paths. A 
closely related specification known as the “error-correcting mechanism” (also having the 
acronym ECM) models both the short and long-run relationships between variables. 
The estimates in Annex A point to a number of generalizations about the relationship between 
Asia’s economic growth and that of the United States and Europe. As the summary Table 2.4 
shows, the foreign income elasticities for the ASEM countries are generally consistent with 
expectations. The short-term foreign income elasticities have a mean average of 0.66, and they 
range from a low of 0.26 in India to an average of 0.94 for the ASEAN member countries. The 
long-term foreign income elasticities have a mean average of 1.64, and range from 0.45 in other 
ASEM countries (Japan, Korea, Mongolia and Pakistan) to around 2.5 in China and India.  
The short-term elasticities are consistent with those found in earlier studies. The International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) found that a 1 percentage point fall in US growth leads to around a 0.5 
percentage point decline in growth in the East Asian Newly Industrialized Economies (NIEs) of 
South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore and the ASEAN-4 (Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Philippines, and Thailand) after one quarter.14 While the estimates for China and India appear 
robust in our estimates, the results for the ASEAN countries are likely to be underestimated. 
Individual country estimated for those countries yield an average long-term elasticity of 2.0 for 
ASEAN members, which is twice the estimate using aggregated data in the present study.15
                                                          
14 International Monetary Fund, “World Economic Outlook”. April 2007. See in particular, Chapter 4: “Decoupling the 
Train? Spillovers and Cycles in the Global Economy.” 
 For 
China and India, the results are support expectations of high foreign income elasticities since 
developments in these countries have been closely tied to the US and EU markets and their 
domestic economic growth has substantially outpaced that of the US and EU markets. 
Nonetheless, it is important to note that they dynamics underlying the adjustment process 
indicate that China and India generally adjust more slowly to foreign income changes than the 
ASEAN member countries.  
15 See M. Lord “Modeling ASEAN Global Linkages”. Manila, Asia Development Bank, 1999. 
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III. CAN ASIA DECOUPLE IN THE NEAR FUTURE? 
 
A. Trade Linkages 
1. Growing External Exposure of Asian Economies  
The rapidity with which ASEM member countries have opened their economies in the last 15 
years is impressive (Table 3.1). Although all of the Southeast Asian economies initially 
embarked on import-substituting industrialization, over time they shifted to export-oriented 
industrialization policies, starting with Singapore in the late 1960s, followed by Malaysia, the 
Philippines, and Thailand in the 1970s, and finally Indonesia in the mid-1980s. Export-oriented 
industrialization led to an opening of the economies to more markets, and the promotion of 
foreign direct investment (FDI) as a means of upgrading the industrial structures through the 
transfer and diffusion of advanced industrial technologies. As a result, the exposure of the 
economies to foreign trade in now large, nowhere more so that in Malaysia and Singapore. In 
terms of changes over the last two decades, however, Cambodia has experience the largest 
change in its openness to trade. Other economies now having experienced a dramatic growth in 
the exposures to trade are India, Thailand, Vietnam and China. In contrast, the exposures of 
Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia and Pakistan have changed little, if any, from what they were two 
decades ago.  
 
2. Exposure to US and EU Markets 
Notwithstanding the growing openness of the Asian economies, most countries have succeeded 
in reducing their dependence on the US and EU markets (Table 3.2). However, the sharp 
reductions that occurred in 2008 relative to 2007 raise some questions about the validity of the 
recent data. The data should therefore be interpreted with caution. The ASEAN member 
countries have lowered their reliance on the US market from 16 to 11 percent between 1980 
and 2008, while the share of exports to the EU market fell more moderately from 13 to 11 
percent. In contrast, China has increased its share to the US and EU market from 5 to 18 
percent and from 15 to 20 percent respectively.  
Table 3.1: ASEM Member Country Exports as Percent of GDP  
  1990 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Brunei 61.8 59.7 59.9 57.2 50.5 55.8 67.4 69.5 67.1 69.3 68.8 70.2 71.8 67.7 
Cambodia 2.4 31.2 25.4 33.7 31.8 37.2 49.9 52.7 55.4 56.5 63.6 64.1 68.6 65.3 
Indonesia 25.3 26.3 25.8 27.9 53 35.5 41 38.2 32.7 30.5 32.2 34.1 31 29.4 
Lao PDR  na   na   na   na   na   na   na   na   na   na   na   na   na   na  
Malaysia 74.5 94.1 91.6 93.3 115.7 121.3 119.8 110.4 108.3 106.9 115.4 117.5 116.7 110.2 
Myanmar 1.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.2 0.2  na   na   na  
Philippines 27.5 36.4 40.5 49 52.2 51.5 55.4 49.2 50.2 49.6 50.9 47.6 47.3 42.6 
Singapore 183.2 187 181.6 175.2 172.7 183.9 195.6 191.6 192.3 212.5 225.4 238.5 246.2 230.9 
Thailand 34.1 41.8 39.3 48 58.9 58.3 66.8 65.9 64.2 65.7 70.7 73.4 73.5 73.2 
Vietnam 36 32.8 40.9 43.1 44.8 50 55 54.6 56.8 59.3 65.7 69.4 73.6 76.8 
China  19.0   20.2   20.1   21.8   20.3   20.4   23.3   22.6   25.1   29.6   34.0   37.3   39.9   40.7  
Japan  10.4   9.2   9.8   10.9   10.9   10.3   11.0   10.6   11.4   12.0   13.3   14.3   16.1   17.6  
Korea  28.0   28.8   27.9   32.4   46.2   39.1   40.8   37.8   35.3   37.9   44.0   42.3   43.0   45.6  
India  7.1   11.0   10.5   10.8   11.2   11.7   13.2   12.8   14.5   14.8   18.1   19.9   22.1   21.2  
Mongolia  na   na   na   na   na   na   na   na   na  57.7   66.7   64.3   65.3   na  
Pakistan  14.8   16.7   16.9   16.1   16.5   15.4   13.4   14.7   15.2   16.7   15.7   15.7   15.3   13.9  
ASEAN avg  49.6   56.7   56.2   58.7   64.4   66.0   72.4   70.3   69.7   72.3   77.0   89.4   91.1   87.0  
ASEM avg  37.6   42.6   42.2   44.3   48.9   49.3   53.8   52.2   52.1   54.6   59.0   64.9   66.5   64.2  
Source: Asian Development Bank, Key Economic Indicators for Asia and the Pacific 2008. Manila, August 2008. 
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3. Dynamics of Trade Linkage  
Movements in both trade volumes and world market prices for traded commodities have 
impacted on the foreign demand for ASEM country exports in various degrees. The importance 
of foreign firms in the export sector is well-documented and there is ample evidence that export-
orientation is one of the most important determinants of FDI flows (see, for example, Singh and 
Jun, 1995 and references therein). Moreover, the terms-of-trade shocks that hit Southeast Asia 
in 1997 had major repercussions on corporate earnings expectations. Stock markets in those 
countries contracted sharply, particularly in Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines, and both 
foreign and domestic investors began to move funds offshore (Noland et al., 1998). At the same 
time, the growing openness of the Asian economies has deepened the close link of economic 
growth to the rapidly changing global economy, and produced rapid advances in all areas of 
globalization covering trade, cross-border investments and international financial activities.  
To gauge the magnitude of Asia’s trade dependence, especially with the United States and the 
European Union, we used world market prices for primary non-fuel commodities relative to 





























ASEAN US plus EU      0.40       1.00       0.11       0.28       0.39       0.63       0.40       1.25  
China US plus EU      0.18       1.41       0.15       0.83   -  -      0.01       0.05  
Other ASEM US plus EU      0.12       1.00       0.09       0.33       0.16       0.17       0.01       0.08  
Notes: 
1. Foreign Income Elasticity: Measures the percentage change in real GDP of each country or grouping brought about by a 1 
percent change in the real GDP growth of the United States and the European Union. 
2. Commodity Terms of Trade: Measures the percentage change in brought about by a 1 percent change in the relative prices of 
non-fuel commodities to manufactures. 
3. Foreign Import Demand Elasticity: Measures the percentage change in real GDP of each country or grouping brought about by 
a 1 percent change in the volume of imports of the United States and the European Union. 
4. Asia Private Capital Flows Elasticity: Measures the percentage change in real GDP of each country or grouping brought about 
by a 1 percent change in the net private capital flows of the developing Asian economies. Net private capital flows comprise net 
direct investment, net portfolio flows, and other long- and short-term net investment flows including official and private 
borrowing. 
Table 3.2: Changing Trade Exposure of ASEM Economies to the US and EU Economies a/ 
  United States European Union 
  1980 1990 2000 2007 2008 1980 1990 2000 2007 2008 
Brunei 8.6% 3.4% 12.0% 5.5% 1.1% 0.0% 0.2% 3.6% 1.2% 0.2% 
Cambodia na 0.0% 65.9% 58.1% 53.9% na 5.0% 20.6% 20.9% 22.5% 
Indonesia 19.6% 13.1% 13.7% 10.2% 9.8% 6.7% 12.2% 14.3% 11.6% 11.5% 
Lao PDR na 0.1% 2.3% 1.4% 2.5% na 9.4% 26.2% 12.2% 10.9% 
Malaysia 16.3% 16.9% 20.5% 15.6% 13.0% 18.3% 15.5% 14.0% 12.8% 10.7% 
Myanmar 0.5% 2.3% 22.4% 0.0% 0.0% 12.8% 6.9% 16.7% 6.9% 3.7% 
Philippines 27.5% 37.9% 29.8% 17.0% 12.8% 18.0% 18.5% 18.1% 17.0% 10.9% 
Singapore 12.3% 21.2% 17.3% 8.9% 7.1% 13.3% 15.5% 14.0% 10.7% 10.3% 
Thailand 12.7% 22.7% 21.3% 12.6% 11.4% 26.6% 23.3% 16.3% 13.8% 12.8% 
Vietnam na 0.0% 5.1% 20.8% 20.7% na 7.9% 20.5% 18.5% 18.5% 
China 5.4% 8.5% 20.9% 19.1% 18.4% 14.8% 10.2% 16.4% 19.9% 20.1% 
Japan 24.4% 31.6% 30.1% 20.4% 17.8% 15.6% 20.7% 16.8% 14.7% 14.0% 
South Korea 26.5% 28.6% 21.9% 12.3% 10.8% 16.9% 15.0% 14.3% 14.7% 12.4% 
India 11.5% 15.1% 21.3% 14.9% 13.1% 24.7% 28.5% 24.3% 21.4% 20.7% 
Mongolia na 2.0% 24.3% 4.8% 2.6% na 25.6% 7.7% 6.1% 4.6% 
Pakistan 5.3% 12.4% 25.2% 18.0% 16.0% 21.9% 36.7% 27.9% 22.2% 22.1% 
Sub-Total ASEAN 16.2% 19.4% 19.0% 12.4% 10.7% 12.9% 16.0% 15.0% 12.6% 11.4% 
Total ASEM 20.2% 25.1% 23.7% 16.7% 15.2% 15.2% 18.1% 16.1% 16.4% 15.8% 
a/ Trade exposure is measured as the exports to the United States or the European Union relative to total exports to all destinations. 
Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF), Direction of Trade database (July 2009). 
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those of manufactures, as well as the volume of total US and EU imports of goods.16 To 
measure the effect of foreign direct investment and portfolio flows, we used the broad measure 
of developing Asia net private capital flows, available from the International Monetary Fund.17
As expected, US and EU import volumes and world commodity market prices relative to those 
of manufactures are significant in explaining changes in the ASEAN and other ASEM countries’ 
real GDP. Although US and EU import volumes were not statistically significant in determining 
GDP movements, overall world trade volumes were found to be an important determinant of 
GDP, suggesting that China’s economy is not as open as most other Asian countries and that 
there is somewhat less concentration in the US and EU markets. The average of the estimated 
US and EU import elasticities equals for the ASEAN countries (0.6) is substantially higher than 
that of the other ASEM countries (0.2). In the case of the global terms of trade, the average 
elasticity is higher in China that in the rest of the Asian country groupings. For private capital 
flows, the elasticity is much higher in the ASEAN member countries that in the rest of Asia. 
These flows refer to private capital flows comprise net direct investment, net portfolio flows, and 
other long- and short-term net investment flows including official and private borrowing. They 
reflect both the existence of large foreign direct investment into the region and the rising 
importance of portfolio flows in the ASEAN economies.
 
The estimates of the relationship for the ASEAN member countries, China and other ASEM 
countries are detailed in Annex A and summarized in Table 3.3.  
18
B. Intra-Regional Trade and Global Production Networks 
  
Asia’s declining share of trade with the United States and the European Union is partly due to 
the considerable expansion of trade within the region. In the ASEAN area, for example, the 
combined value of total exports of member countries has grown by five percentage points since 
the early 1990s (Figure 3.1). It would be misleading, however, to suggest that this trend reflects 
a growing decoupling of the region from the US and EU business cycle. Indeed, many of the 
products traded between the ASEAN countries has grown from the globalization of production 
                                                          
16 Commodity exports of the ASEM countries encompass a fairly broad range of products such as rubber, palm oil, 
tin, sugar, coconut oil, maize, and other agricultural and mineral commodities. We used the IMF’s broad-based price 
series for primary commodities, which is an index covering 31 agricultural, mineral and metal commodities. For 
manufactures, we used the World Bank’s Manufactured Unit Value (MUV) index, which is a composite index of prices 
for manufactured exports from the five major (G-5) industrial countries (France, Germany, Japan, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States) to low- and middle-income economies, valued in U.S. dollars. The MUV index 
covers products in Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) groups 5–8 and is constructed using trade-
weighted unit value indexes for each country. 
17 Based on data available from International Monetary Fund (IMF), International Financial Statistics database, June 
2009.  
18 In a more detailed study of international trade linkages for the ASEAN member countries, Lord (1999) examined 
interest rate differentials and investment risks effects on capital markets. He used four alternative measures: (a) the 
ratio of the Japanese yen LIBOR three-month rate to the US dollar LIBOR rate, (b) the ratio of the Japanese yen 
lending rate to the US dollar LIBOR rate, (c) ratio of the nominal lending rates in each ASEAN-5 country to the 
Japanese yen LIBOR three-month rate, and (d) ratio of the nominal lending rates in each ASEAN-5 country to the US 
dollar LIBOR rate. To measure investment risk effects, the study he uncovered interest parity relationship, an investor 
will be indifferent between borrowing abroad or at home if the following relationship holds: it = ift + Δset + γt, where i is 
the domestic loan rate, if is the foreign loan rate, γ is the risk premium from the risk differential of the foreign and 
domestic loans, and the term Δset = (Set+k – St)/St is the expected change in the real exchange rate.18 Since γt  = (it - 
ift) - Δset, the expectation of a devaluation of the domestic currency will increase the risk premium for foreign loans, 
while the expectation of an appreciation will lower the risk premium. If Δγt > 0 domestic intermediaries will reduce 
foreign borrowing, as well as domestic loans for asset purchases. Alternatively, if Δγt < 0 domestic intermediaries will 
increase foreign borrowing and domestic loans for asset purchases. 
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activities and the associated expansion of intra-industry trade in processing and assembly 
products as part of cross-border supply chains (Table 3.4). Asian economies are therefore 
increasingly specializing in the intermediate stages 
of the production chain, with the final assembly 
into final goods done in China. These final goods 
are then shipped to their destination markets 
within and outside the region, including the United 
States and the European Union. With China 
providing the final assembly stage, most Asian 
economies now ship fewer goods to the US 
directly, although intra-regional shipments of 
intermediate goods continue to rise. However, the 
ADB has estimated that, after tracking the ultimate 
destination of trade of intermediate goods, as 
much as 60 percent of East Asia’s exports are 
ultimately destined for the US, EU and Japanese 
markets.19
International outsourcing by large enterprises 
depend on borderless manufacturing and 
procurement activities involving multiple 
enterprises, suppliers, manufacturers and 
retailers. Not only have value chains become one 
of the principal driving forces behind private 
sector development throughout Asia, but 
governments in the region are increasingly 
supporting programs to enhance international 
networking capabilities and international 
development agencies like the World Banka and 
the Asian Development Bank are providing technical assistance and loans that provide support 
to value chain systems as a means of boosting exports and encouraging the commercial 
development of small and medium size enterprises (SMEs).
 
20
C. FDI Flows within Asian Region 
 
The traditional model of globalization focused almost exclusively on the US-EU-Japan triad. In 
Asia the pattern of FDI and cross-border equity flows with the triad reflected changes that were 
brought on by currency realignments between the mid-1980s and 1990s. When the US dollar 
fell against East Asian currencies between 1987 and 1996, exports from the region shifted from 
the United States and Europe to Japan as relative price movements induced a gradual 
depreciation of the real effective exchange rates of many of the developing East Asian 
economies. 21
                                                          
19 Asian Development Bank, “Asian Development Outlook 2007”. Manila, 2007 
 As the yen began to appreciate in both nominal and real terms, Japanese firms 
20 See, for example, World Bank, “Building Export Competitiveness in Laos”.  Background Report. East Asia PREM. 
November 2006; Foreign Investment Advisory Service, “Moving Towards Competitiveness: A Value Chain Approach”. 
Foreign Investment Advisory Service (FIAS), World Bank, 2007; Asian Development Bank, “South Asia Strategic 
Framework for Aid for Trade Road Map”. March 2009; and Asian Development Bank, “Country Strategy and Program 
Update 2007-2010: Viet Nam, Socialist Republic of”, 2009. 
21 For a description of the shift in East Asia's exports from the United States and other industrialized countries to 
markets within the region following the currency realignment of 1986, see Robertson (1994).  
Figure 3.1: ASEAN Intra-Regional Trade, Share of 
Total Exports to World, 1990-2007 
 
Data source: WTO Secretariate, Statistical database. 
Table 3.4: Top Export Product Categories of 
ASEAN Countries, 2007 
HS 
Code Description 





85 Electric machinery, equipment and parts 24.8% 23.8% 
84 Machinery and mechanical appliances 15.2% 14.6% 
27 Mineral fuels, mineral oils & products  19.3% 11.1% 
Sub-Total of All Exports 59.3% 49.5% 
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Table 3.5: Main Sources of Foreign Direct Investment 
Inflow to ASEAN Region, 2006-2008 
  
Share of total inflow 
2006 2007 2008 
European Union  19.4   26.5   20.3  
United States  6.2   9.1   5.9  
Asia, of which  38.9   34.2   36.1  
ASEAN  13.8   13.5   18.4  
Japan  18.6   12.1   12.8  
Korea 2.3  4.5  2.1  
China, Mainland 1.8  1.8  1.9  
China, Hong Kong 2.3  2.3  0.9  
Sub-Total  64.5   69.8   62.2  
Other  35.5   30.2   37.8  
Total FDI inflows 100.0  100.0  100.0  
 
relocated their production activities to those Asian countries having low labor and natural 
resource costs. The result was that, over the last ten years, capital stocks of Japan in the Asian 
region have been catching up to those of the United States.22 At the same time, EU 
transnationals started to penetrate the Asian region. 23 However, in the aftermath of the 1997 
Asian financial crisis FDI inflows into South, East and South-East Asia fell to 10 percent of the 
world total in 1999-2000, down from a high of 23 percent in 1996.24 In the first half of the current 
decade Asia was able to recover much of its share of total world FDI, and by 2005 its share had 
risen to 20 percent of annual flows. Although 2007 FDI flows to the region reached a record 
level of $248 billion, the global economic slowdown led to sharp inward FDI declines in Japan, 
the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, 
Taiwan and Thailand. In contrast, the 
UNCTAD World Investment Report has 
reported a continued rise in inflows in China, 
India, Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam, 
though a downturn is expected to have 
occurred in the first part of 2009 in these 
countries.25
In the new model of globalization, China and 
India have become an important source of 
capital flows for the rest of Asia. China has 
been directing nearly 60 percent of its FDI 
towards the Asian economies and has 
therefore become one of the principal driving 
forces behind Asia’s investment boom. Concurrent with these flows have been large FDI flows 
from East Asia into China. Yet China’s FDI growth has not occurred at the expense of other 
countries in the region since FDI flows to East Asian have themselves increased sevenfold 
since the early 1980s.   
 
D. Globalization of Financial Markets 
Asia’s financial linkages with the United States and the European Union have been manifest in 
stock market developments. Table 3.6 show the close 
association between movements in the US stock 
market (represented by the S&P 500 index), the 
European stock market (represented by the FTSE 
100 index) and the Asian stock market (represented 
by the Heng Seng, NIKKEI and the Kuala Lumpur 
Stock Exchange indices). While US and the European 
stock market generally move in tandem, the Japanese 
NIKKEI stock market has also exhibited a close 
association with movements in the US and European 
stock markets. There has been somewhat less 
synchronization of movements in Hong Kong’s Heng 
Seng index, although this phenomenon reflects a 
                                                          
22 For details, see (Kawai, 1997). 
23 Recent estimates by Anderson and Francois (1997), however, show that the expansion is likely to be gradual. 
24 All data in this section related to FDI flows are from UNCTAD FDI/TNC database. 
25 Based on information from Oxford Analytica, as reported by Forbes, 8 May 2009. 
Table 3.6: Asia, US and EU Stock Market 
Developments, 2000 to mid-2009 
  
United 





Seng  NIKKEI 
Correlation 




±5.1% ±9.5% ±8.4% ±3.2% 
Volatility Index 16.4% 15.0% 23.7% 20.9% 
Note: The Black-Scholes index of volatility is calculated as 
the standard deviation of the natural log of price changes, 
adjusted by the square root of the number of months in 
the sample. 
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recent divergence from a much closer association in 2000-2006. Recent empirical work on the 
financial linkages between emerging market stock markets and those in the major US and 
European financial centers supports the view that these markets are highly correlated and that 
the extent of co-movements among these markets has grown to such an extent in recent years 
that de-coupling these financial markets is unlikely to occur.26
E. International Currency Linkages 
  
1. Exchange Rate Misalignments 
Since the middle of the last century the dollar’s 
dominance as the international numeraire and 
exchange medium to trade across multiple 
currencies has been supported by five drivers: the 
United States’ large economic size, political stability 
and well-developed financial system, confidence in 
the currency’s value, and its so-called network 
externality whereby the currency has become more 
valuable as more people use it.  
The dollar’s volatility has had mixed effects on the 
ASEM countries, largely depending on conditions 
dictated by their exchange rate regimes (Table 3.7). 
Most countries have informally pegged their 
currencies to the dollar, while retaining the official 
policy of free-floating regimes. For example, China 
maintains a de facto peg to the dollar (adjusted in 
June 2008), and Malaysia keeps the ringgit within a 
narrow range relative to the dollar. Despite these 
efforts, however, in 2008 countries like Korea, 
Pakistan and India experienced substantial nominal 
devaluations of their currencies, notwithstanding the 
weakening of the US dollar, while others like Japan, China and Singapore experienced large 
appreciations in their currencies. These large movements reflect the longer term volatility in 
exchange rate movements, especially for Indonesia, the Philippines, South Korea, and Japan. 
Moreover, in some of the Least Developed Countries (LDCs), notably Cambodia and Laos, the 
economies remain partly dollarized, making them particularly susceptible to the dollar’s 
instability.  
1.1. Misalignments and International Competitiveness 
How currency exchange movements impact on the competitiveness of the Asian economies 
depends on their real effective exchange rates (REERs), and their transmission mechanism 
within the economies.27
                                                          
26 N. Frank and H. Hesse, “Financial Spillovers to Emerging Markets during the Global Financial Crisis”. International 
Monetary Fund, IMF Working Paper WP/09/104, May 2009. 
 To illustrate their impact on the Asian economies, we focus the 
27 The real exchange rate is defined as ert  =  (entPft)/Pt, where en is the nominal exchange rate, Pf is the foreign 
currency price of goods purchased abroad, and P is the domestic price level.  A fall in er represents a real revaluation 
under a fixed exchange rate system, and an appreciation under a flexible exchange rate system. The fall is 
associated with either a rise in the nominal exchange rate en or a rise in relative prices of domestic goods (equivalent 
to a fall in relative prices of foreign goods). Conversely, a rise in er represents a real devaluation in a fixed exchange 
rate system, and a depreciation in a flexible exchange rate system. 
 Table 3.7: ASEM Countries’ Nominal 










Brunei -1.9% -6.0% 4.3% 
Cambodia 0.7% 0.0% 23.8% 
Indonesia 2.8% 6.1% 24.8% 
Lao PDR 4.1% 0.0% 31.0% 
Malaysia -1.4% -3.0% 7.3% 
Myanmar -1.5% -3.1% 5.4% 
Philippines 1.8% -3.6% 11.7% 
Singapore -1.9% -6.1% 4.3% 
Thailand -1.2% -3.5% 8.2% 
Vietnam 1.8% 1.2% 12.5% 
China -1.9% -8.7% 10.6% 
Japan -0.8% -12.2% 10.7% 
Korea -0.4% 18.6% 11.1% 
India 0.2% 5.2% 7.0% 
Mongolia 1.5% -0.4% 12.4% 
Pakistan 4.2% 15.9% 5.7% 
 
Data source: International Monetary Fund database. 
Note: The Black-Scholes index of volatility is 
calculated as the standard deviation of the natural 
log of exchange rate changes. 
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Table 3.8: ASEAN-5 Real Effective Exchange Rates (REER) by Region, 1980-2008 (2000=100) 
  Indonesia Malaysia 
  World US EU China Japan 
Other 
ASEAN World US EU China Japan 
Other 
ASEAN 
1990 62.4 57.2 80.3 65.1 51.7 67.7 83.3 76.4 107.2 86.9 69.0 98.8 
1991 63.2 57.7 78.5 58.5 55.6 69.1 84.9 77.5 105.5 78.6 74.7 101.4 
1992 65.2 57.6 82.8 58.2 58.2 73.9 80.1 70.6 101.6 71.4 71.4 96.4 
1993 63.2 55.6 71.9 59.9 62.9 71.1 80.7 71.0 91.9 76.5 80.4 97.8 
1994 63.4 54.4 71.1 47.4 65.7 72.5 83.4 71.6 93.6 62.4 86.5 103.3 
1995 65.4 53.2 76.1 54.5 67.8 75.1 83.8 68.1 97.5 69.7 86.8 103.1 
1996 61.3 53.3 73.9 57.7 57.1 76.0 78.2 68.0 94.4 73.6 72.9 103.9 
1997 69.1 63.8 77.1 69.6 61.2 81.7 82.2 75.8 91.7 82.7 72.8 101.8 
1998 142.0 141.0 167.0 150.5 124.0 144.3 102.7 102.0 120.7 108.8 89.6 97.4 
1999 97.0 93.6 109.7 96.4 92.3 99.7 101.7 98.2 115.1 101.1 96.8 105.8 
2000 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
2001 106.5 112.3 108.3 110.1 96.2 104.6 96.1 101.4 97.7 99.3 86.8 92.0 
2002 87.9 92.6 94.8 88.7 75.0 86.4 96.0 101.2 103.5 96.8 81.9 96.7 
2003 81.5 81.8 100.0 77.4 69.8 76.1 102.1 102.4 125.2 96.9 87.4 101.6 
2004 84.9 82.5 110.3 79.0 73.5 77.5 106.6 103.7 138.6 99.3 92.4 103.9 
2005 85.0 83.8 111.0 79.9 70.7 79.8 105.1 103.6 137.3 98.8 87.4 104.6 
2006 72.7 72.2 95.4 69.5 56.1 72.9 100.7 100.0 132.2 96.3 77.7 110.6 
2007 72.1 69.9 100.1 71.8 52.1 76.1 97.5 94.5 135.4 97.1 70.5 111.6 
2008 76.2 70.1 107.3 80.4 58.2 81.7 98.1 90.3 138.2 103.6 75.0 112.4 
  Philippines Singapore 
  World US EU China Japan 
Other 
ASEAN World US EU China Japan 
Other 
ASEAN 
1990 104.8 96.0 134.8 109.2 86.7 130.6 103.3 94.6 132.9 107.7 85.5 128.4 
1991 104.6 95.5 130.0 96.8 92.0 130.7 99.6 90.9 123.7 92.2 87.6 123.2 
1992 95.0 83.9 120.7 84.8 84.7 119.1 97.9 86.4 124.3 87.3 87.3 123.4 
1993 97.0 85.3 110.4 92.0 96.6 122.6 98.1 86.2 111.6 92.9 97.7 124.2 
1994 91.2 78.2 102.3 68.2 94.5 115.2 94.6 81.1 106.1 70.7 98.0 120.4 
1995 88.8 72.1 103.3 73.9 92.0 110.8 93.7 76.1 108.9 77.9 97.1 118.2 
1996 79.8 69.4 96.3 75.2 74.5 106.6 88.4 76.8 106.6 83.2 82.4 120.7 
1997 81.8 75.4 91.2 82.3 72.4 101.2 88.0 81.2 98.2 88.5 77.9 110.8 
1998 97.6 96.9 114.7 103.4 85.2 91.3 93.8 93.2 110.3 99.4 81.9 86.8 
1999 92.1 89.0 104.2 91.6 87.7 93.5 99.8 96.4 112.9 99.2 95.0 103.4 
2000 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
2001 105.2 111.0 107.0 108.8 95.1 103.1 100.3 105.8 102.0 103.7 90.6 97.1 
2002 105.2 110.9 113.5 106.1 89.8 108.4 102.3 107.8 110.3 103.2 87.3 104.7 
2003 114.9 115.2 140.8 109.0 98.3 117.4 106.5 106.8 130.6 101.1 91.2 107.1 
2004 118.7 115.4 154.3 110.5 102.8 118.4 107.6 104.6 139.9 100.2 93.2 105.1 
2005 110.4 108.9 144.2 103.8 91.9 111.2 107.5 106.0 140.4 101.0 89.4 107.6 
2006 99.3 98.6 130.3 94.9 76.6 108.7 104.2 103.5 136.8 99.6 80.4 115.3 
2007 91.5 88.7 127.1 91.1 66.2 103.2 102.0 98.9 141.6 101.6 73.7 117.9 
2008 88.2 81.2 124.2 93.1 67.4 98.5 98.3 90.5 138.4 103.8 75.1 112.7 
  Thailand ASEAN-5 
  World US EU China Japan 
Other 
ASEAN World US EU China Japan 
Other 
ASEAN 
1990 82.2 75.3 105.7 85.7 68.0 97.0 79.0 73.8 96.7 81.6 68.3 90.7 
1991 81.1 74.0 100.7 75.1 71.3 95.7 78.7 73.3 93.8 74.1 71.2 90.6 
1992 82.6 72.9 104.9 73.7 73.7 100.3 78.1 70.8 94.8 71.4 71.4 91.3 
1993 82.4 72.4 93.8 78.1 82.0 100.3 77.6 70.2 86.0 74.4 77.3 90.8 
1994 81.9 70.3 91.9 61.2 84.9 100.9 77.3 68.7 84.7 62.0 79.5 91.3 
1995 83.3 67.6 96.9 69.3 86.3 102.3 78.2 66.6 88.3 67.8 80.5 92.0 
1996 76.9 66.9 92.8 72.4 71.8 101.8 73.0 65.4 84.9 69.6 69.1 91.3 
1997 87.0 80.3 97.1 87.5 77.1 109.2 78.7 73.9 86.0 79.2 71.6 93.5 
1998 100.1 99.4 117.7 106.1 87.4 94.3 115.4 114.8 132.5 121.2 103.1 110.9 
1999 95.9 92.6 108.5 95.4 91.3 98.3 98.1 95.4 108.3 97.7 94.3 100.4 
2000 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
2001 106.2 112.0 108.0 109.8 96.0 104.3 103.0 107.6 104.4 105.8 95.0 100.8 
2002 103.7 109.3 111.9 104.7 88.6 106.5 95.9 100.0 101.9 96.6 84.9 97.0 
2003 105.8 106.1 129.7 100.4 90.6 106.2 96.5 96.7 113.7 92.7 85.6 95.9 
2004 105.7 102.8 137.5 98.5 91.6 102.8 99.2 97.1 122.6 93.9 88.8 96.6 
2005 103.0 101.6 134.6 96.8 85.7 102.1 98.0 97.0 121.4 93.5 85.2 97.1 
2006 95.1 94.4 124.8 90.9 73.4 103.1 90.1 89.7 111.6 87.1 74.5 95.4 
2007 89.3 86.6 124.0 89.0 64.6 100.2 87.5 85.5 113.2 87.2 69.2 95.5 
2008 89.4 82.2 125.8 94.3 68.3 100.1 88.1 82.6 115.8 91.8 72.0 96.2 
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empirical analysis on the 
ASEAN-5 (Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Philippines, 
Singapore and Thailand). 
Not surprisingly, the results 
show that as a group these 
countries have gradually 
reduced their international 
competitiveness in the global 
economy during this decade, 
particularly in the US, 
Chinese and Japanese 
markets, but also the EU 
market in more recent years. 
Table 3.8 shows the results 
of the REER calculations for 
the world as well as specific 
export markets. In the first 
half of the 1990s, the 
ASEAN-5’s REER remained 
almost unchanged as devaluations of the currencies of some countries were offset by 
appreciations in those of others. Exports of all countries nevertheless surged during this period, 
particularly in Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore. In 1996 all ASEAN-5 currencies appreciated in 
real terms and, with the exception of Singapore, they all devalued sharply in 1997-98. Since 
then, most currencies have appreciated in real terms, particularly that of Indonesia. However, 
these movements differ across markets. The average real effective exchange rate of the 
ASEAN-5 appreciated more against the Japanese yen than against other major markets 
between 200 and 2008. In contrast, most of the countries experienced real exchange rate 
devaluations against the euro between in the first half of this decade and have since then 
appreciated (Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand) or remained relatively unchanged against the 
euro (Malaysia and Singapore). All countries have experienced real exchange rate 
appreciations against the US dollar between 2005 and 2008. 
Volatility in the exchange rates of the Asian countries are generally considered to be 
unfavorable to their economies and most governments have adopted managed floats in their 
currencies that allows them to fluctuate within a limited range over time (Table 3.9). Nearly all 
countries manage or peg their currencies to adjust in value in foreign exchange (forex) markets 
as long as their currencies do not exceed some defined values that could affect foreign 
currency, inflation limit or monetary policy limits. The notable exception is the Philippines, which 
until March 2008 allowed its currency to float freely in forex markets. There have nonetheless 
occurred considerable competitive adjustments among most exchange rates throughout Asia 
that have affected the international competitiveness of most countries, as exemplified by the 
real exchange rate movements that have occurred in these countries (Table 3.8). 
1.2. Measuring the Magnitude of Transmissions  
For the ASEAN-5 countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand), we 
measured the effects of the following variables:  
 Foreign income in the form of real GDP growth of the United States and the European 
Union. 
Table 3.9: ASEM Countries De Facto Classification of Exchange Rate Regimes, 
2008 
  
Exchange Rate Arrangement 
Exchange Rate 













Brunei       X         
Cambodia X       X       
Indonesia X           X   
Lao PDR X       X       
Malaysia X             X 
Myanmar X       X       
Philippines     X       X   
Singapore X         X     
Thailand X           X   
Vietnam   X             
China         X       
Japan     X         X 
Korea     X       X   
India X             X 
Mongolia   X     X       
Pakistan X       X       
Source: De Facto Classification of Exchange Rate Regimes and Monetary Policy 
Frameworks, as of April 13, 2008. Washington, DC, April 2009. 
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 Exchange rates in the form of the real effective 
exchange rate of the ASEAN-5 countries; 
 International prices in the form of the terms of world 
market prices for primary commodities relative to 
those of manufactures; 
 Foreign import demand in the form of the volume of 
US and EU imports.  
 Capital inflows in the form of the net private capital 
flows of the developing Asian economies, where net 
private capital flows comprise net direct investment, 
net portfolio flows, and other long- and short-term net 
investment flows including official and private 
borrowing. 
The estimated equation is presented in the Annex and 
the estimated elasticities are summarized in Table 3.10. 
The results generally indicate that changes in these 
foreign income, trade and financial variables lead to a 
more-that-proportional change in the economic growth of 
the ASEAN member countries as a group. However, the 
level of statistical significance is higher for capital flows 
and real exchange rates than it is for trade, as measured 
by the US and EU import demand. Commodity prices, 
measured through the terms of trade of primary 
commodities relative to manufactures, were not found to be statistically significant in explaining 
GDP movements, which is explained by the fact that some ASEAN countries are net importers 
of primary commodities while others are net exporters.  
F. Implications for Asia’s Decoupling 
The empirical evidence in this chapter as well as the previous one provides the basis for some 
forward looking views about Asia’s prospects for decoupling as a means of mitigating adverse 
external effects from cyclical downturns and better insulating the region’s economies from 
external shocks.  
1. Business-cycle co-movements with the US and European economies are unlikely 
to diminish in the near to medium term.  
There are strong linkages both within Asia and between Asia and the United States and Europe, 
and the magnitude of international transmissions have not waned in the last 25 years. However, 
the transmission channels have become more complex as new sources of those spillovers arise 
in terms of portfolio flows, stock market volatility, and integrated production networks. 
2. Traditional channels of international transmissions in the form of trade linkages 
with the US and EU economies are likely to weaken as shifts occur towards 
greater trade with intra-Asia markets as well as the Middle East and Central Asia. 
The ASEM countries’ combined exports to the United States fell from 25 to 15 percent between 
1990 and 2008, while those directed to the European Union fell more modestly, from 18 to 16 
percent during the same period. There are significant downside risks for the recovery of growth 
in the United States and Europe. Over the medium term, US and EU consumer spending are 
expected to be sluggish relative to economies like China where earlier high savings rates are 
Table 3.10: ASEAN-5 Region's Foreign 
Income, Financial Indicator, World 








Elasticity 0.35 1.33 
Foreign (US-
EU) Import 
Demand 0.12 1.11 
Asian Private 
Capital Flows 0.02 1.17 
Real Effective 
Exchange Rate 0.07 1.39 
Notes: 
1.  Foreign Income Elasticity: Measures the 
percentage change in real GDP of each country 
or grouping brought about by a 1 percent change 
in the real GDP growth of the United States and 
the European Union. 
2. Foreign Import Demand Elasticity: Measures 
the percentage change in real GDP of each 
country or grouping brought about by a 1 percent 
change in the volume of imports of the United 
States and the European Union. 
3.  Asia Private Capital Flows Elasticity: 
Measures the percentage change in real GDP of 
each country or grouping brought about by a 1 
percent change in the net private capital flows of 
the developing Asian economies.  
4.  Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER) 
Elasticity: Measures the percentage change in 
real GDP of ASEAN group brought about by a 1 
percent change in the REER for those countries. 
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expected to fall significantly as the government introduces stimulus packages centered on 
expenditures. If Asia leads the recovery with China at its center, the policy focus should be on 
mechanisms to shift trade as well as investment from slow growth markets to the more dynamic 
economies. That shift could support a structural change in Asia’s trading patterns over the 
medium term. 
3. The types of goods produced as outsourcing for large enterprises is likely to 
incorporate more second-generation technology and it could increasingly shift to 
intra-regional production networks.  
In the near term multinationals will continue to be dominated by US, EU and, to a lesser extent, 
Japanese firms. In 2006, the top 50 transnational corporations (TNCs) accounted for about one-
eighth of the estimated assets, sales and employment of all TNCs in the world. Of these TNCs, 
nine have parent companies in the United States, four are from Japan, and the remaining 37 are 
European.28
4. Foreign direct investment (FDI) sources are increasingly shifting toward Asia.  
 It is unlikely that, as a group, the shares of these top-ranked companies will be 
significantly eroded in the near to medium term. For the Asian countries to develop their own 
cross-national production networks and compete in the global market they will need to 
implement domestic investment and technological development programs. Managerial, 
technological, financial, and know-how requirements continue to be prohibitively high for many 
sectors in Asia. Consequently, it is difficult for these countries to emerge and compete with firms 
in the industrialized economies. One effective channel has been successfully pursued by 
Malaysia and Thailand that encourages investment by foreign transnationals as a means of 
attracting technology and production know-how through complementary relationships with those 
firms. Another would be sub-regional cooperation schemes aimed at developing scale 
economies and private capital investment of the type of magnitude needed for effective 
competition at the global level. However, schemes like the ASEAN Investment Area (AIA) were 
established a decade ago to promote such cross-border investments but have been 
underutilized. Although the AIA provides for (a) the elimination of investment barriers, (b) 
liberalized investment rules and policies, and (c) grants national treatment to member countries, 
there are a large number of exceptions that create disincentives among private investors. There 
is some hope, nevertheless, that cross-border investments among the larger countries will be 
occur based on a recent decision to combine the AIA with the ASEAN Agreement on the 
Promotion and Protection of Investments into a single ASEAN Comprehensive Investment 
Agreement (ACIA) in support of the development of an ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) 
Although intra-Asian FDI flows have grown substantially in the last ten years, the medium and 
long-term sustainability of those flows is likely to depend on the recovery of trade, investment 
and financial capital flows within the region. While shorter distance between Asian countries 
facilitates bilateral FDI flows, low sovereign risk, a transparent and predictable regulatory 
environment and small corporate tax rates in the host countries are also important 
determinant.29
                                                          
28 UNCTAD database on FDI/TNC and cross-border M&As. 
 Technological developments affecting manufacturing and service industries, 
especially those in information technology, biotechnology, and new materials, will nonetheless 
continue to be concentrated in the industrialized countries, and the comparative advantage of 
the Asian economies will be in their ability and willingness to participate in globally integrated 
production system. Foreign direct investments that exploit the dynamics of globalization will 
likely continue to characterize the Asian growth model.  
29 R. Hattari, R.S. Rajan, and S. Thangavelu, “Understanding Intra-Asean FDI Flows: Trends and Determinants and 
the Role of China and India.” January 2008. Available: http://www.freewebs.com/rrajan1/OFDIASEAN.pdf  
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5. Asia’s major stock market linkages to the major US and EU financial centers will 
likely continue to increase.  
Stock market indicators in Asia are highly correlated with the major financial centers in the 
United States and Europe. The extent of these co-movements is much greater now than they 
were before in the 1980s and 1990s. De-coupling in the financial markets could negatively alter 
the growing share of portfolio flows in the region’s overall private capital flows. 
6. Pegged and managed exchange rates will continue to form part of the policy tools 
used in most Asian economies notwithstanding the lessons from the Asian 
financial crisis. 
Most governments are likely to maintain either pegged or managed float of their currencies in an 
effort to reduce volatility in their exchange rates. Recent changes in the international 
competitiveness of the region’s countries have been unfavorable to some countries, especially 
those that have informally pegged their currencies to the US dollar. The resulting appreciation of 
some currencies in terms of their real effective exchange rates relative to other Asian 
economies and major US and European markets could push policymakers to adopt the types of 
exchange rate policies that were introduced after the Asian financial crisis but have since then 
been abandoned by most countries. Otherwise the continued management of exchange rates 
could have a considerable impact on competitive adjustments that could, in turn, create 
considerable downsize risks to the recovery in the global economy through a much-needed 
rebalancing of the global current accounts. 
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IV. FORWARD LOOKING POLICY IMPLICATIONS  
 
A. Redefining the Asian Growth Model 
The current downturn in economic activity throughout Asia highlights the inherent 
unsustainability of an economic growth model dependent on foreign demand. This situation has 
given rise to widespread suggestions by policymakers in the Asian economies to take concrete 
actions to rebalance their economies in such a way that will ensure greater sustainability in the 
medium to long run. Yet the fundamental question facing those policymakers is how to 
rebalance growth in such a way as to reduce the region’s dependence on the continued global 
current account imbalance. According to the recent Asian Development Outlook, even though 
the optimal policy mix for rebalancing will necessarily differ across countries, some of the key 
areas involving supply and demand-side policies to strength domestic demand and alter the 
production structure of the economies.30
Policies promoting greater domestic consumption are generally favored over those encouraging 
investment since Asia’s widening current account surplus has been driven by high savings 
rates. In support of this policy prescription, a recent study by Park and Shin found stronger 
evidence of over-saving than under-investment in the region, and stronger evidence of over-
investment prior to the 1997 Asian crisis than underinvestment after the Asian crisis. Those 
results suggest that the key to rebalancing Asian growth toward domestic sources lies in 
promoting consumption rather than investment.
  
31
Specific policies that would encourage increased domestic consumption include (a) initiatives 
that help shift corporate savings to household savings; (b) greater state provision of health care, 
education, and pension benefits to help mitigate the household risk and uncertainty and reduce 
precautionary savings; and (c) enhancing the regulatory climate for investment and 
expansionary fiscal policies that in the short run involve lower takes and greater government 
spending. On the supply side, policies that would promote a better balance include (a) providing 
access to the types of finance that more closely align production to domestic demand; and (b) 
move away from tightly managed exchange rate regimes toward a more flexible approach. At 
the regional level, there is also considerable scope for ameliorating external shocks and 
broadening regional arrangements to promote wider and more diversified intra-regional trade. 
That regional process could help to promote scale economies and greater specialization in all 
activities of the value chain.  
 
B. Liberalizing Trade and Investment Policy Regimes 
There is considerable scope for deepening trade liberalization within the ASEAN countries and 
broadening the coverage to other Asian countries as a means of strengthening the so-called 
‘domestic’ regional economy. A larger regional bloc would promote scale economies and 
specialization in differentiated products that would expand intra-industry trade in Asia. Progress 
in moving from a free trade area to a customs union in ASEAN could also yield substantial 
                                                          
30 Asian Development Bank, “Asian Development Outlook 2009”. Manila, 2009. See also C. Adams and D. Park, 
“Causes and Consequences of Global Imbalances: Perspective from Developing Asia”. ADB Economics Working 
Paper Series No. 157, April 2009. 
31 D. Park and K. Shin, “Saving, Investment, and Current Account Surplus in Developing Asia”. ADB Economics 
Working Paper Series No. 158, April 2009. 
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producer and consumer welfare benefits to the region.32
C. Liberalizing Exchange Rate Regimes 
 The resulting expansion in production 
and domestic demand in individual Asian economies could stimulate cross-border production 
activities to target the increased demand for final goods and thereby increase the relative 
importance of final goods in intraregional trade. In addition to the progress being made among 
the ASEAN+3 countries, there is a strong interest in expanding trade between Southeast Asia 
and South Asia through such initiatives like the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral 
Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), which aims to promote free trade within the 
region, increase cross-border investment and tourism, and promote technical cooperation 
among its members comprising Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Bhutan and 
Nepal.  
The important role of Asian countries’ real effective exchange rates in determining economic 
growth suggesting external markets outside of Asia may not be as important to growth as the 
exchange rate regimes of countries.33 Opportunities therefore exist for countries to adopt more 
flexible exchange rate regimes that would enable Asian countries to adopt policies that promote 
a rebalancing based on the reallocation of resources from the production of tradables to 
nontradables, and thereby enable their economies to better adjust to weakening global demand. 
The prescription could become all the more appropriate if there were to occur a further US dollar 
depreciation, perhaps in the order of 15 to 25 percent, as part of the reversal of the global 
current account imbalance. In that case, many Asian currencies would likely experience a 
significant nominal and real exchange rate appreciation.34 Lower relative prices would help to 
shift resources toward production for domestic use, raise household incomes and stimulate 
consumption. Although in the short run it is generally recognized that policymakers are unlikely 
to embrace these expenditure switching measures that shift demand between domestic goods 
and imports because of pressure to improve the external competitiveness and promote exports, 
it could become a long-term strategy in the context of rebalancing growth towards domestic 
sources.35
D. Regional Collaboration in a New International Financial Architecture 
  
The US dollar’s chronic instability and Asia’s growing influence over how the region develops 
could produce a new monetary order in which either a new or existing regional currency would 
serve as the vehicle for international trade transactions. One mechanism has been proposed by 
China to introduce an International Monetary Fund (IMF) asset that would decouple international 
                                                          
32 See M. Lord, “Moving towards a Common External Tariff Regime in ASEAN”. ASEAN Secretariat, Capacity Building 
for the ASEAN Secretariat: Common External Tariff Regime, December 2008. 
33 The estimates in this study estimates are based on aggregate data and a broader specification of the model could 
yield different results in terms of the importance of foreign import demand to the export performance of specific Asian 
countries. For country specific estimates, see See M. Lord “Modeling ASEAN Global Linkages”. Manila, Asia 
Development Bank, 1999. For product grouping estimates, see Jongwanich, “Determinants of Export Performance in 
East and Southeast Asia”. Manila, Asia Development Bank, ERD Working Paper No. 106, which suggested that 
diversification of exports away from traditional products and toward assembly and component parts within global 
industries have tended to weaken the link between the real exchange rate and Asia’s export performance, and 
strengthened that of the link to world demand. 
34 See Obstfeld, M. and K. Rogoff. "The unsustainable U.S. current account position revisited," Proceedings, Federal 
Reserve Bank of San Francisco, 2007. 
35 See, for example, International Monetary Fund, “Regional Economic Outlook: Asia and the Pacific. Global Crisis: 
the Asian Context”. Washington, DC, May 2009. 
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transactions from the US dollar. In the interim, some countries like Indonesia have introduced 
bilateral currency swap arrangements (BCSAs) as a means of reducing their dependence on 
the US dollar. In March 2009 Indonesia signed a three-year BCSA with China allowing it to use 
the Chinese RMB to pay off transactions between the two countries without having to use the 
US dollar. This procedure could be extended to other countries in the region to promote trade 
and investment and provide short-term liquidity to the financial markets. 
Another mechanism for reducing transactions risks is the example of the euro’s dominance as a 
settlement currency within its regional domain. A similar vehicle within East Asia might be 
possible, given the region’s large economic size and far-reaching trade connections. Countries 
pegging softly to a key international currency within the region would be more likely to use it as 
their main intervention currency as well as a reserve currency. While the dollar would dominate 
reserve holdings within the dollar area and the euro within the euro area, an East Asian 
currency could become the settlement currency in that regional domain. Efficiency gains of a 
limited number of international currencies would be maintained and transactions risks would be 
reduced. There are nonetheless efficiency gains in limiting the number of vehicle or transactions 
currencies, first, because it requires fewer foreign exchange markets and, second, because 
fewer exchange markets lowers transaction costs. 
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ANNEX A:  Technical Notes 
 
Our estimates of the international transmission of income and other changes on the ASEM 
countries separate the long-run or equilibrium relationships between domestic income and 
foreign income, prices and other variables from the short-run or dynamic disequilibrium 
components of those relationships. We examine global linkages of the ASEM countries using an 
error-correction mechanism (ECM) specification that provides the means by which the short-run 
observed behavior of variables is associated with their long-run equilibrium growth paths. The 
ECM adjusts for any disequilibrium between variables that are cointegrated. As a result, it 
provides the means by which the short-run observed behavior of variables is associated with 
their long-run equilibrium growth paths. A closely related specification known as the “error-
correcting mechanism” (also having the acronym ECM) models both the short and long-run 
relationships between variables.  
To illustrate the adjustment process of these transmissions, we can estimate the simple 
relationship of real GDP growth of all ASEAN-5 countries to changes in real GDP growth in all 
the global regional economies (Japan plus US plus EU). Let the variable Y represent the real 
GDP growth of the ASEAN-5 and Z represent the real GDP growth of the global regional 
economies. The resulting estimate of the ECM relationship between these two variables is as 
follows: 
 ∆yt = -1.77 – 0.11(y – z)t-1 + 0.51∆zt + 0.14zt-1 (A.1) 
 (2.4) (2.7) (2.4) 
 
  R2 = 0.83 dw = 1.3 SE =  0.014 
where lower-case letters denote the logarithms of the corresponding capitals, the t-statistics are 
shown in parentheses, R2 is the corrected squared multiple correlation coefficient, dw is the 
Durbin-Watson statistic, and SE is the standard deviation of the residuals.   
The estimated equation yields a short-term elasticity of 0.51 long-run elasticity of 2.27 (= 1 + 
0.14/0.11) with respect to real GDP of the global regional economies. The growth rate of the 
selected global regional economies is given by ∆z, whose steady-state path can be denoted g. 
A constant growth rate of g = ∆z, yields the long-run dynamic relationship: 
 Y = kZ2.27 (A.2) 
where k = exp{[-1.77/-0.11] + [-0.11-.51x(-0.11)-0.14)/-0.112]g = exp(16.09 - 16.02)g. Since g = 
2.8 percent was the average growth rate of real GDP in the global regional economies during 
the period 1971-98, then k = 0.03 and the ratio of real GDP of the ASEAN-5 to that of the 
selected global regional economies equals 1.68 percent, which approximates the average ratio 
in 1971-98. The ASEAN-5’s real GDP growth is therefore shown to be influenced by changes in 
both the level and rate of growth of real GDP in the global regional economies.   
Table A.1 presents the estimates for the ASEM countries’ GDP relationship to foreign income, 
while Table A.2 includes estimates for not only foreign income, but the commodity terms of 
trade, imports by the G7 countries and net private capital flows. 
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The final estimate is for the ASEAN-5 countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore 
and Thailand) with the real effective exchange rate included in the relationship. The results are 
as follow: 
∆yt = -1.28 - 0.18(y – z)t-1 + 0.35∆zt + 0.06z-1 – 0.07r-1 + 0.02∆dt  
 (2.7) (1.8) (1.8) (2.6) (7.8) 
+ 0.03d-1 + 0.12∆qt + 0.02q-1+ vt (A.3) 
 (7.7) (4.9) (1.6) 
  R2 = 0.99 dw = 2.7 SE =  0.004 
Where Y = Domestic GDP, Z = Foreign GDP of US and EU, W = Commodity terms of trade (i.e., 
non-fuel commodity price index relative to manufactured unit value index), Q = Import volume of 
G7 industrialized countries, D = Developing Asia net private capital flows, and R = Real effective 
exchange rate of the ASEAN-5 countries, trade weighted by their respective GDP shares.
Table A.1: Regression Results of ASEM Members' GDP Relationships to Foreign Income 
Δyt = ao + a1(y – z)t-1 + a2Δzt + a3z-1 + vt 




Regions ln(Y/Z)t-1 Δln(Z)t lnZt-1 Const R2 dw SE dof 
ASEAN a/ c/ US plus EU 
-0.06 0.94   -0.19 0.86 1.40 0.02 16 (2.1) (3.6)  
China US plus EU 
-0.07 0.56 0.10 1.14 0.30 1.42 0.03 17 (1.8) (1.7) (1.5) 
India d/ US plus EU 





-0.22 0.86 -0.12 0.9 0.82 1.53 0.01 20 -2.9 (4.7) (4.3) 
Notations (lower-case letters denote logarithms of upper-case letters): 
Y = Domestic GDP 
Z = Foreign GDP 
a/ Includes a binary variable for 1998 (1 in 1998; 0 otherwise). 
b/ Includes a binary variable for 1999 (1 in 1999; 0 otherwise). 
c/ Includes a binary variable for 1991 (1 in 1991; 0 otherwise). 
d/ Includes a binary variable for 2000 (1 in 2000; 0 otherwise). 
Notes: R2 is the adjusted R2; figures in parentheses below the coefficients are t-statistics. 
 Table A.2: Regression Results of ASEM Members' GDP Relationships to Foreign Income, Commodity Prices, 
G7 Imports, and Private Capital Flows 
Δyt = ao + a1(y – z)t-1 + a2Δzt + a3z-1 + + α6∆wt + α7w-1 + α8∆qt + α9q-1+ α10∆dt + α11d-1+ α12∆kt + α13k-
1 + vt 




Regions ln(Y/Z)t-1 Dln(Z)t lnZt-1 Dln(W)t lnWt-1 Dln(Q)t lnQt-1 Dln(D)t lnDt-1 Const R2 dw SE dof 
ASEAN US plus EU 
-0.4       0.11 0.39 0.25 0.4 0.5 -2.4 0.95 2.30 0.01 16 (2.9)    (1.7) (3.4) (2.4) (10.9) (9.2) 
China US plus EU 
-0.18   0.07   0.15       0.01 -1.98 0.68 1.63 0.01 12 (1.7)  (1.8)  (2.2)    (2.2) 
India d/ US plus EU 





-0.12     0.09 0.04 0.16 0.02 0.009 0.009 
-0.73 0.83 1.5 0.01 13 (3.7)   (1.9) (2.0) (1.9) (2.8) (2.8) (1.8) 
Notations (lower-case letters denote logarithms of upper-case letters): 
Y = Domestic GDP  
Z = Foreign GDP of US and EU 
W = Commodity terms of trade (i.e., non-fuel commodity price index relative to manufactured unit value index) 
Q = Import volume of G7 industrialized countries 
D = Developing Asia net private capital flows  
Notes: R2 is the adjusted R2; figures in parentheses below the coefficients are t-statistics.  
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